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Abstract— The most important mechanism for improving the  
safety of a system is to identify the hazard state of the system  
as it has the potential to cause an unexpected, unplanned or  
undesired event or a series of events. A hazard that occurs in  
a system could inevitably lead to an accident (loss event), which  
could result in an injury or illness or even loss of a human  
life, and the hazard could also have a negative impact on the  
environment. An approach in hazard analysis is proposed in this  
paper in order to avoid hazard from happening in a safety-critical  
system. The approach consists of three steps: (1) deriving hazards  
from safety properties, (2) using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to  
analyze the possible causes of each hazard, and (3) converting  
each minimal cut-set of FTA into a formal property in terms of  
variables used in the formal specification. A case study based on  
an Auto-cruise Control (ACC) system for vehicles is used as an  
example to illustrate the process. 
Keywords— hazard; hazard identification; hazard analysis; 
safety-critical systems  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Hazard analysis is an examination of a system or subsystems  
to identify and classify each potential hazard that could occur  
in the system, and it must be carried out at an early stage  
of the system development. The aim of the analysis is to  
deliver a system which does not pose an unacceptable danger  
to its end-user or to the environment in which the system is  
installed [1][2]. This analysis can be carried out using a range  
of techniques, each technique providing a different insight into  
the characteristics of the system under investigation [3]. If  
the hazard analysis is not carried out, the hazard events may  
occur when the system is put into operation. For example, the  
smart card reader utilised at a train station may reorganize  
another card into a smart card, or a commuter could travel to  
his destination even though the credit available on his card is 
insufficient. 
The proposed approach for hazard analysis involves three  
steps: (1) Deriving hazards from safety properties, (2) Using  
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to analyze the possible causes of  
each hazard, and (3) Converting each minimal cut-set of FTA  
into a formal property in terms of variables used in the formal  
specification. The proposed approach provides guidelines on  
how  to  identify  hazards,  analyze  the  causes  of  a  hazard  
and write these causes in formal language for verification. 
The requirement specification is written in SOFL 
(Structured Object-Oriented Formal Language) as it 
provides a formal and comprehensible language for the 
requirements and design specification as well as a practical 
method for developing the software systems. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the 
background of the research and is followed with Section III 
which presents the process of hazard analysis. Then Section 
IV illustrates the proposed process with a case study on an 
Auto-cruise Control (ACC) system, while Section V describes 
the related study, and finally, conclusion and recommended 
future works is described in Section VI.  
II.  BACKGROUND  
Hazard analysis is a process that is conducted after the 
safety properties of a system has been captured. A range of  
techniques can be used in the analysis; each technique has its  
own style of doing the analysis. In this research, Fault Tree  
Analysis (FTA) is chosen for the hazard analysis and SOFL  
language is used to describe the specification module. As such,  
a brief introduction of SOFL, FTA and some previous studies  
are hereby presented. 
A. SOFL 
SOFL (Structured Object-oriented Language), a formal 
engineering method, is an integration of data flow 
diagrams, Petri nets and VDM-SL. It provides a formal graph- 
ical and textural notation to construct specifications, integrates 
abstract data types and high-level languages for system imple- 
mentation, and provides a flexible notation for using structured 
methods or object-based methods, when appropriate. 
A SOFL specification is a hierarchy of condition data flow 
diagrams (CDFD), where each CDFD in the hierarchy is 
associated with a specification module. The modules, the most 
important component of the SOFL specifications, are mainly 
used to express the architecture of the system. Conceptually a 
module has the following structure: module name, CDFD and 
specification of the components, as shows in Fig.1. 
Based on Fig.1, the hierarchy of CDFDs and module  




rectangle in the CDFDs denotes a process, and each directed 
line represented a data flow. The CDFD involving processes 
1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, corresponding to module SYSTEM, is the top 
level CDFD. A process performs an action, task, or operation 
that takes in an input and produces an output; the data flow 
indicates a data item moving from one process to another; and 
a data store represents a data repository. A complex process 
can be decomposed into the subsequent lower level CDFD 
with an associated module that must be written after the 
keyword Decom for good traceability in the documentation. 
As an example based on Fig. 1, process 1.3 is decomposed 
into the CDFD containing process 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, and 
its associated module, named 1.3_Decom [4].   
Fig. 1. An Outline of a Specification in SOFL 
B. Fault Tree Analysis(FTA) 
Numerous model and techniques can be used to perform 
hazard analysis,  and  this  includes  FTA[20],  checklists[3], 
event  tree  analysis[23],  failure  modes  and  effect  analysis 
(FMEA)[3][21],  and  failure  modes,  effects  and  criticality 
analysis (FMECA)[22]. In this research, FTA is chosen for 
performing the hazard analysis. 
FTA was originally developed in 1961 by H.A. Watson of 
Bell Telephone Laboratories to facilitate the reliability analysis 
of the Minuteman missile system. FTA is a common and 
valuable safety analysis technique that is applied during the 
design phase. It is initially used to analyze the causes of 
hazards, not to identify the hazards itself. 
The fault tree is developed in a top-down manner, and the 
logic gates indicate the passage of the fault logic up the tree. 
The event should be traced back until it cannot be developed 
further due to the lack of knowledge or because no other 
causes can be identified. The approach is graphical and a fault 
tree is constructed using the standard symbols, several varieties 
and extension. In this paper, the fault tree is constructed using 
only the symbols shown in Fig.2. 
When FTA is used to analyse a system, all possible causes 
that lead to a certain unexpected event must be identified. A 
fault tree can be constructed in the following way: starting 
with the top event, identify the first-level contributors that 
cause the top event and connect the first-level contributors with 
the top event using a logic gate. Then, identify the second-
level contributors that cause the first-level event and connect 
the second-level contributors with the first-level event using a 
logic gate. This process is repeated until all the required 
detail is achieved; the causes on the lowest level are called 
the basic event. Fig.3 demonstrates the construction of a fault 
tree.    
Fig. 2. Fault Tree Symbols 
Fig. 3.   Construction of a Fault Tree 
The rules for the construction of a fault tree are as follows: 
(1) all inputs to a logic gate must be described before 
proceeding to the next gate, (2) each level should be 
completed before beginning the next level, and (3) start with 
the direct causes are closest to the top event. The goal of the 
analysis is to find all minimal cut-sets as it provides the 
information that helps to identify the weaknesses in the system 
[6]. 
C. Previous Work 
The study presented in this paper is continuation of the 
study previously done [7], in which a process to capture the  
safety properties of a system has been proposed. As shown  
in Fig.4, the process consists of three steps: (1) Capturing  
the desired safety-related functions, necessary data resources  
and constraints, (2) Deriving functional scenario from safety- 
related function, and (3) Deriving safety properties from  
functional scenario using the five keys introduces in [7] as  
guidelines. 
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Fig. 4. Capturing Safety property 
The five keys for capturing safety properties are functional 
constraints, domain knowledge, developer experience, real- 
time constraints for functions and the input/output device. 
These processes and five keys will assist the developer in 
finding and identifying the appropriate safety properties re- 
quired to ensure that the related functions are free from failure. 
The relationship between capturing safety process and hazard 
analysis process is shown in Fig.5. 
Fig. 5.   Relation between Capturing Safety Properties and Hazard Analysis 
Process 
III. THE HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESS  
The process of hazard analysis, as illustrated in Fig.6, 
consists of three steps: (1)  Deriving  hazards  from  safety  
properties, (2) Using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to analyse  
the possible cause for each hazard, and (3) Converting each  
minimal cut-set of FTA into a formal property in terms of  
variables  used  in  the  formal  specification.  Each step that  
describes an operation is represented by a rounded rectangle  
box in the figure, and each data item, such as Safety Properties  
or Hazards, is represented by a card box. An arrow from a card  
box to an operation means that the data item of the card box  
is an input to the operation, and an arrow from an operation to  
a card box means that the data item of card box is an output  
of the operation. An arrow from one operation to another  
operation shows a control flow. The detailed explanations of  
the operations are discussed in the following subsection.  
A. Deriving hazards from safety properties 
First, hazards for each safety property must be identified. 
The goal of hazard identification is to recognise the potential  
failures of system modes that could lead the system to a  
hazardous state. Gowen et. al [8] described four methods to  
identify a hazard for safety-critical software systems, which  
are historical-data analysis, prototype analysis, brainstorming  
and interviews. Jesty et. al [9] considered the safety policy and  
safety envelope that needed to be verified to identify a hazard  
for an automotive system; the safety policy is the company  
strategy for encouraging and maintaining safety, and the safety  
envelope is the operational and environmental limits within  
which the system is expected to behave in a safe manner. John  
[10] considered data from previous accidents (case study) or  
operating experience, and scenario development and judgment  
of knowledge individuals to identify hazard for transportation  
system. Brady et. al [11] considered ten methods to identify  
hazards for lunar landing; the methods listed were a combi- 
nation of human eyes, the human brain, goggles, an external  
illuminator, a camera and lidar. Numerous methods can be  
used to identify a hazard; the chosen method depends on the  
type of critical system to be developed.  
Fig. 6. Hazard Analysis Process 
B. Using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to analyse the possible 
cause for each hazard 
After confirming the hazards for safety properties, these 
hazards need to be analysed in order to identify its potential  
causes. In this research, the analysis is conducted using FTA  
as: (1) it is a useful tool for reliability and safety analysis; (2)  
it is a top-down approach starting with an undesirable event,  
called a top event, and all the possible ways that the top event  
can happen could be determined; and (3) if there is a critical  
failure mode, all the possible ways that the mode can occur  
will be discovered [12].   
The top event is a potential hazard that has been derived 
from safety properties. For each hazard, a fault tree need to be 
developed and an undesired event need to be defined. Then, the 
event is resolved into its immediate causes; this resolution of 
events continues until the basic causes are defined. The 
purpose of contributing the fault tree is to obtain the minimal 
cut-sets. Each minimal cut-set is the smallest combination of 
component failures that would cause the top event to occur if 
the component failures all occur [13]. 
As an example, in the hazard fault tree shown in Fig.7, the 
top event is a hazard and would occur when event A, event B 
and the subsequent events occur. Given a hazard fault tree HT, 
the top event HAZARD can be determined by {Event A}, 
2013 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Engineering Solutions (CIES) 135
  
{Event C, Event E}, {Event C, Event F} or {Event C, Event 
G}. By convention, each set of leaf events of these four 
branches is called a minimal cut-set of the fault tree HT, and 
the set of all four minimal cut-sets is called the cut-set of HT; 
namely, the cut-set of HT is {{Event A}, {Event C, Event E}, 
{Event C, Event F} {Event C, Event G}}. 
Fig. 7. Fault Tree Analysis for Hazard Analysis 
C. Converting each minimal cut-set of FTA into a formal 
property in terms of variables used in the formal 
specification 
The last step is to convert each minimal cut-set of FTA into 
a formal property in terms of variables used in the  
formal specification. Fig.8 shows the process that consists of  
three steps: (1) use the same variable name from the safety- 
related function; (2) use the same variable name from the  
module if the variable name from the safety-related function is  
unsuitable; and (3) create an appropriate variable name if the  
variable name from the module is still inappropriate. The card  
box representing the formal specification and minimal cut- 
set are used for reference. The minimal cut-set is converted  
to formal property because the result will be used to perform  
rigorous verification using the testing or inspection techniques.  
This verification is important to ensure that each property  
obtained in hazard analysis is not implied by the formal 
specification. 
Fig. 8. The Converting Steps 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In this research, a case study was conducted on Auto-cruise 
Control (ACC) systems An ACC system is one of  
the subsystems of on-board automobile (OBA) systems that  
enhance the safety of the occupants of a vehicle, particularly  
when travelling over long distances on highways. The ACC  
system provides the cruise operation with the following four  
modes: (1) activate or deactivate auto-cruise systems, (2) start  
or stop acceleration when the vehicle speed is increasing  
or decreasing, (3) resume control of ACC system, and (4)  
inform the driver, through LED indication, of certain problems  
detected while driving the vehicle (for example, via the use of  
the "Care to speed" LED). 
Fig. 9. Informal Specification of ACC Systems 
The requirement specification of ACC systems is written 
using SOFL, and the informal specification for the ACC  
systems is shown Fig.9. This informal specification consists  
of three parts: the required functions, the data resources of the  
ACC systems to be managed, and the constraints reflecting  
the policy of the auto-cruise. It has eleven functions, and  
the detail explanation of each function is written in semi- 
formal specification and formal specification. The semiformal  
specification is derived from the informal specification, and 
its goal is to clarify and define all the functions, resources  
and constraints, and to determine the relations among the 
three parts contained in the informal specification. The formal 
specification is made up of the formal implicit specification 
(abstract design) and the formal explicit specification (detailed 
design). However, for this research, only the formal implicit 
specification is used, but the overall picture of the system 
structure can be seen from the CDFD. The CDFD is a diagram 
that describes the functional operations, data flows for data 
communications among processes, and data storage that keeps 
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data for processes to access or update. CDFD for the ACC 
systems is shown in Fig.10. 
Fig. 10. CDFD of ACC Systems 
For this paper, Brake_Action has been chosen as example 
to illustrate the hazard analysis process. The Brake_Action 
function is  a  decomposition  from  Reduce_Speed  function. 
Fig. 11 shows the CDFD for decomposition of Reduce_Speed 
function.     
Fig. 11. Semiformal Specification of Brake_Action Function 
Fig. 12 shows the semiformal specification for 
Brake_Action. The semiformal specification serves as a 
channel for communication between the developer and the 
end user; hence, it should not be fully formal as the user is 
not expected to understand the specific formalism used in 
writing the specification. 
The formal specification for Brake_Action shows in Fig.13 
and the specification is represented in abstract design. The  
abstract design transforms the semiformal specification into a 
formal specification that represents the architecture of the 
entire system and functional definitions of its components.  
Fig. 12. The Decomposition of Reduce_Speed Function 
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Fig. 13. Formal Specification for the Brake_Action Function 
A. Deriving hazards from safety properties 
Fig. 14. Hazard for the Brake_Action Function 
Each safety property may have one or more hazards. For 
Brake_Action function, the hazards are identified using the  
historical-data analysis and John.A method. This method  
identifies hazards by examining the hazards and failures of  
similar systems, data from previous accidents, and scenario  
development. 
Fig. 14 shows the hazards of the Brake_Action function. 
The form for hazard has four parts: the function name, data  
resources, safety properties and hazards of the safety-related  
function. For this function, there are two safety properties and  
two hazards.  
B. Using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to analyse the possible 
cause for each hazard 
After confirming the hazards for each safety properties, 
each hazards must be analysed, and in this paper, Hazard 1, 
which is "The brake pedal is not working properly when it is 
pressed", has been chosen as an example. Fig.15 shows the 
fault tree of Hazard 1, and there are four minimal cut-sets or 
events: (1) the brake component did not meet the industrial 
standard, (2) the hydraulic lines were not properly joined, (3) 
the piston rubber failed, and (4) the brake fluid contained air 
and water. 
Fig. 15. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the Hazard One 
C. Converting each minimal cut-set of FTA into a formal 
property in terms of variables used in the formal 
specification 
The last step is to convert each minimal cut-set to  
formal language. Fig.16 shows  the  minimal  cut-set  of  
Hazard 1, and  the  same  variables  from  the  formal  
specification  are used to represent this minimal cut-set in 
formal property. For example, when event number 4 “The 
brake fluid contained air and water” is converted to formal 
property, it represents “brake_fluid=false”.   
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 Fig. 16. Formal Language for the Minimal cut-set Brake_Action Function 
V. RELATED WORK 
Ericson [14] defined four types of hazard analysis: 
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), subsystem hazard analysis 
(SSHA), system/integrated hazard analysis (SHA/IHA), and 
operating and support hazard analysis (O&SHA). Neil [15] 
stated that PHA is used as an early means of hazard 
identification during the design and development processes. 
PHA consists of  five  tasks: (1)  determine  what  hazards  
might exist during the operation of the system and their 
relative magnitude; (2) develop guidelines, specifications and 
criteria to be followed in system design; (3) initiate actions to 
control particular  hazards; (4)  identify  management  and  
technical responsibilities for action and risk acceptance and 
assure that effective control is exercised over the hazards; and 
(5) determine the magnitude and complexity of the safety 
problems in the program (i.e., how much management and 
engineering attention is required to minimize and control the 
hazards). 
Several research projects have been conducted to improve 
PHA techniques. Gowen et.al [8] improved the PHA process 
by providing a framework as a guideline to identify, eliminate, 
document and review hazards.  The  framework  has  seven 
steps: defining terminology, obtaining system level hazards, 
identifying  software-related  hazards,  assessing  hazard 
consequences, categorizing  hazards,  documenting  hazards  
and reviewing hazards. Though the result from this framework 
is in natural language, it is difficult to verify. Zhao et.al [16] 
modified the traditional PHA into the reliability- centred 
preliminary hazard analysis (RCPHA) as the effect from 
traditional PHA is limited; the method used by Zhao is 
more concerned with risk assessment activities. Klim [17] 
used fuzzy logic to add more powerful features to a classic 
hazard assessment methodology. The risk-ranking matrix was 
adopted to create the fuzzy set rules, and he claimed that the 
hazard analysis performed with the fuzzy risk ranking better 
reflect some real scenarios of the system failures. Each type 
of hazard analysis is supported by a number of tools and 
techniques; in addition, the range of techniques provides a 
different insight into the characteristics of the system under 
investigation. 
One major problem in performing hazard analysis is in 
selecting an appropriate model and techniques that match the 
projects goals. In this research, fault tree analysis (FTA) is 
chosen as a technique to analyse hazards. Several research 
works combined FTA with a formal method or formal 
specification languages. Pahsa et. al [18] calculated failures 
and faults to identify the most critical functions. They 
calculated the probability of occurrence of the fire hazard 
from FTA and Petri Net modelling, and the results show that 
Petri Net modelling is more accurate and more quantitative for 
the required specifications of the system safety analysis. Xiang 
et. al [15] transforms FTA to formal FTA by specifying the 
safety properties found in FTA with CafeOBJ and verify them 
via a proof structure. CafeOBJ [19] is the language used for 
writing and verifying formal specifications of models for a 
wide variety of software and systems. In this research, 
combination of FTA and SOFL are used to conduct the 
analysis.     
VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
This paper illustrates an approach to deriving and analyzing 
hazards from safety properties by presenting a case study of an 
ACC system as an example. The case study has demonstrated 
that hazards can be derived and analysed in three steps. This 
paper focuses only on how to derive and analyse hazards from 
safety properties without considering any critical or 
complicated issues, such as concurrent hazards. A better 
verification technique still needs to be explored for future 
research. 
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